This article discusses the impact of nafta on the Mexican film industry with special emphasis on the effects of neoliberal ideology, both on film audiences and its contents. It describes an industry that caters exclusively to the economic elites, blindly following the logic of economic optimization and foregoing any attempt at a cinematic project rooted in national culture. The author then analyzes Alonso Ruizpalacios' Güeros (2014) as an interesting case study illustrating the difficulties of trying to resist neoliberalism after decades of living in a society and working inside a film industry strongly shaped by its ideology.
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Neoliberal History and Policy
Neoliberalism became prominent in the late 1970s with the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States, and was further facilitated by Deng Xiaoping's liberal reforms to China's economy (Harvey,-2007: 1) ; it would soon spread, with very few exceptions, to the rest of the world.
These policies, as is well known, emphasize free trade, deregulation, privatization, and fiscal austerity, all of which are meant to ensure that the free market is allowed to flourish without any social or political interference. But, while the "neoliberal moment" began in the late 1970s, its intellectual history dates back to the 1930s, with the writings of Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Walter Lippman, Louis Rougier, and others (Escalante,-2015: 28) . They were attempting to revitalize the principles of classical liberalism, 1 but with an economic emphasis, trying to fight the dominant collectivist spirit that arose in part due to the Great Depression and which led to welfare interventionist policies like the New Deal.
In 1947, the Mont Pelerin Society was formed by 36 scholars committed to developing and promoting this new kind of economic liberalism (Escalante,-2015: 41) .
The society's purpose was long-term. Their inaugural declaration stated they did not align with any political party (Escalante,-2015: 41) ; they did not want to engage in a political fight, but to develop an ideology. It is telling that they chose such an anodyne name, providing them with a certain amount of discretion. It is important to note -and, given their current dominance, difficult to imagine-that they were iconoclasts, outsider radicals who advocated principled, radical ideas at a time when a more pragmatic, cautious Keynesianism was the norm. 2 Neoliberalism's time would come, as I mentioned above, in the late 1970s, thanks to the deep economic crisis of the 1970s. The increasing military spending of the Cold War, coupled with the Vietnam War and an oil crisis that saw the price of a barrel soar from US$2 to US$12 in less than two years, put a strain on U.S. finances. Politically, three presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon) were caught lying about the cost of the Vietnam War. And then there was Watergate. Europe was no better off. In Britain, Prime Minister Edward Heath was forced to declare a state of emergency on 1 Classical liberalism's troubles go back to the late nineteenth century, since it proved incapable of lifting the working class from miserable living conditions (Escalante,-2015: 25) . World War I made things even worse for liberalism, as governments were forced to intervene to keep production up, thus infringing upon the people's freedoms. The critical moment was the crisis of 1929, which generated massive unemployment, prompting governments to use public spending to activate the economy, as exemplified by the U.S.'s New Deal. There was a deep distrust of the free market, and collectivist ideas were prevalent everywhere (Escalante,-2015: 27) . It is in this context that Hayek and company felt the need to renew liberalism, turning not to political rights, but to the free market as the road to freedom and wealth. 2 Keynesianism advocates a watchful eye from the state, which must intervene in the market to prevent undesirable outcomes caused by the private sector. Germany, the Red Army Faction; and in Spain, eta and frap. In the periphery, the protectionist development model began to fail, and many countries turned to the political left, many of their governments openly expressing sympathy toward the Soviet Union. In under ten years, the world had radically changed (Escalante,-2015: 94-95 ).
The stage was set for a change, and neoliberalism fit the bill perfectly, at least in the central countries. The general perception was that governments were to blame for the crisis: too much spending, too many wars, and too many lies. Neoliberalism advocated the exact opposite -at least on the surface-: small government and the smallest amount of intervention possible. The youth movements of the 1960s had an individualistic ethos that fit in well with these ideas. They were mostly comprised of college-educated kids with an unprecedented amount of consumer possibilities in a world with too many rules (Escalante,-2015: 100) . To them, neoliberalism was a radical program that meant freedom. The new political left abandoned the classical causes of inequality and public welfare and concentrated on personal freedoms, authenticity, and the right to difference (Escalante,-2015: 104) . Neoliberalism fed on these protests and was able to maintain an anti-establishment character.
With Thatcher and Reagan in power, the 1980s became what Escalante refers to
as "the offensive." The U.K. and the U.S. implemented policies of privatization, deregulation, and tax and public-spending cuts; and a systematic campaign against unions significantly diminished their power. But domestic policy was only the beginning. For the free market to flourish, it needs to expand, and so it was necessary that the peripheral countries open their markets as well. They were basically forced to by the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World Bank. In 1979, then-U.S.-President Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chairman; in order to contain inflation, he proceeded to raise interest rates from two percent in 1979 to nine percent in 1981. This was unmanageable for the countries on the periphery, which had large debts. The World Bank and imf would then offer to alleviate their situation by renegotiating their debt, but only on condition that they open up their markets to foreign capital (Escalante,-2015: 107) . In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and any alternative was effectively gone. Capitalist neoliberalism was perceived as the only option. Even the cataclysmic financial crisis of 2008 prompted no substantive changes to the new world order. As Frederic Jameson and Slavoj Žižek have famously remarked, it has become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (Fisher,-2009: 2) .
Before ending this very schematic history of neoliberalism, it is important to note three important points. First, despite neoliberalism's discourse about small government and free markets, the neoliberal state does not disappear or remain idle at all. On the contrary, its intervention is indispensable for creating and maintaining markets, as can be attested by the numerous wars, foreign government overthrows, trade agreements, and bank bailouts by the governments of the economic powers.
But, since these interventions are made in the name of freedom, they are excused.
Second, despite the market's globalizing impetus, borders play an essential role in making it more efficient, as they allow capital to exploit the different conditions that each country has to offer: cheap natural resources in one country, cheap labor in another, a tax haven in another, etc. (Escalante,-2015: 183) . And the last point concerns the relationship between the economy and democracy. Neoliberal thought exalts the economy beyond any other discipline, and sees it as the all-important path to freedom and prosperity, which means that it cannot be subjected to the caprices of the people's will, leading to a kind of paradoxical state of affairs in which, in order to attain freedom, the people must relinquish their freedom to influence economic policy.
Neoliberal Ideology
In the very schematic history of neoliberalism outlined above, one argument relies on a very superficial kind of logic. Following Escalante, I pointed out above that the neoliberal moment began when the economic crisis of the 1970s was attributed to a series of bad government interventions, prompting people to embrace the exact opposite of that (at least on the surface), that is, the idea of a non-interventionist neoliberal state. But this is faulty -or at least incomplete-reasoning. The opposite of "bad X" is usually not "no X", but "good X." So an extra argument is needed to go from bad results in government intervention to advocating no intervention at all. It is not even clear that no intervention should be even considered, as, prima facie, it would be hard to believe that doing nothing to foster a good economy, development, and social welfare would result in exactly that. This is where neoliberal ideology comes in, where the efforts of Hayek and company pay off.
To understand the inner workings of neoliberal ideology, we must begin by understanding its relationship with neoclassical economic theory, which tries to predict economic performance by completely divorcing economic activity from its social context. It fundamentally relies on a series of mathematical models used to predict supply, demand, prices, employment, etc., which are equally valid in any social context. These models are not derived from empirical research, but from a set of assumptions. The most important of these assumptions is that the individual is a selfish agent constantly striving to maximize his own individual profits, with no regard for contemPorary iSSueS anything else (Escalante, 2015: 161) . This selfishness -or, as economists like to call it,
rationality-is what supposedly guides the behavior of consumers and suppliers, an interaction of millions of individuals' wills that results in the "optimum" prices, which, if kept away from external interference, will lead to an economy in "equilibrium."
I have put "optimum" and "equilibrium" in quotation marks because they are prime examples of a kind of trick that neoliberalism, through neoclassical economic theory, has played on the public. That is, by assigning words with positive connotations to terms that refer to mere possibilities in a mathematical model, neoliberalism elevates the market, which is fundamentally just a mechanism to process information through the system of prices (Escalante,-2015: 21) , into a symbol of freedom, a promise of wealth and even a normative system for our moral conduct. In reality, from the technical point of view, all that "optimum" and "equilibrium" mean in economic theory is that they are the points at which prices stabilize given the economic forces in the world; but, to the general public, to common sense, they become desirable results. An excellent illustration of this is the existence of what is called the "natural rate of unemployment," an implicit acceptance -a naturalization even-of the idea that there will always be unemployed people, and that this is part of having an optimized economy. When unemployment becomes a good thing, there can be no doubt that the academic argument has become ideological (Escalante,-2015: 77) .
But there is more. It is not only consumers and suppliers who operate under this selfish rationality; according to neoliberalism, it is also public servants. This means that all politicians will do whatever they can to maximize their own profits, and that the supposed public good that drives them is just something they say to get reelected. Even if government officials are well-meaning and think they have the public's interest at heart, they are only imposing their ignorance on the market, which is the only mechanism that "knows" what is good and fair. The only way to optimize the system is to make the public interest coincide with the private interest. Or, in other words, there is no public interest; there is only private self-interest. As Thatcher famously said, "There is no such thing as society; there are only individuals." This is the ideological argument of neoliberalism. On the social level, as we have seen, it commands reducing the public sphere in favor of the private, in order to not impose our ignorance -or even worse, our own political agendas-on the market. But more important, perhaps, are its effects on the individual level, that is, on each of our own identities and world views. On a personal level, the market becomes the prevailing metaphor through which we interpret the world and relate to it (Escalante,-2015: 103) ; each of us is interpellated as a profit-maximizing agent: homo oeconomicus, a sort of personal enterprise in which every one of our actions must be evaluated in terms of a cost-benefit analysis of investment and profit. Even our moral codes become imbued with a sort of distorted Darwinism, a kind of survival-of-thefittest teleological argument whereby whatever actions we take in our own self-interest are the ones that are economically and morally just.
This might begin to explain why, despite its less than stellar economic results, deteriorating working conditions, and repeated crises, neoliberalism has not been seriously challenged. Whatever troubles are encountered are interpreted through the neoliberal ideological matrix, which, to no one's surprise, prescribes more neoliberal policies as the solution.
Mexico's Transition to Neoliberalism
Mexico's political transition to neoliberalism conforms to the general pattern outlined above. As a neighbor of the U.S., this transition was inevitable, and like many other countries on the periphery, it was precipitated during the 1980s by a financial crisis. This transition was consummated with the enactment of nafta on January 1, 1994, but its roots go back many years, at least to 1968, with the student movements that led to the infamous Tlatelolco massacre.
Mexico has a long history of strong governments and particularly of strong presidents. One political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party-(pri), 3 ruled continuously from 1929 until 2000, aided by a long series of murky elections. These authoritarian governments were deeply involved in every facet of society, including the economy. During the 1950s and 1960s, its protectionist, import-substitution policy obtained excellent results that reached a sustained growth of 6 percent annually (Camp, 2010: 569) . Things began to sour in 1968, when violent police intervention in a public school ignited a student movement to protest government repression. This movement grew from June until October 2, when, pressured by the upcoming inauguration of the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, the government decided to put a stop to the protests with a massacre during a demonstration at the Tlatelolco Plaza, in which an estimated 150 to 200 protesters were killed.
This episode was the beginning of the political decline of the Mexican state, but its control over the economy continued to increase well into the 1980s (Camp,-2010: 569 (Camp, 2010: 570) , alienating much of the business community and sparking anger in the general population, who blamed the government for their economic hardships. Just a couple of months later, the imf approved a US$3.8-billion loan to the Mexican government on the condition that it implement a series of free-market reforms.
López-Portillo's appointed successor was Miguel-de-la-Madrid (1982 -1988 the mexIcAn fIlm Industry's trAnsItIon to neolIberAlIsm
Up until the late 1980s, the state was heavily involved in the Mexican film industry, an unacceptable -and soon to be illegal-state of affairs under neoliberalism. And so, from 1988 to 1994, it underwent a complete transformation in all its facets -production, exhibition, consumption, and film content-until it complied with both nafta's legal requirements, and, perhaps more importantly, with neoliberalism's ideological dictums. The following is a brief account of this transformation.
Privatizing a National Cinema
Before neoliberalism came to Mexico, its film industry was almost entirely controlled by the state. In the field of production, a private sector existed that was exclusively dedicated to producing very low-brow fichera and masked-wrestler films, 5 but any film with any kind of artistic intentions was, if approved, completely financed by the state. Exhibition-wise, a few private theatres existed, but most of them belonged to
Compañía-Operadora-de-Teatros,-S.A.-(cotsa), nationalized in 1961 (MacLaird,-2013: 24) . The government regulated ticket prices, keeping them affordable, and there was a 30-percent screen quota for Mexican films.
contemPorary iSSueS
Due to a series of bad administrations, the results of this arrangement went from bad to worse. After the Golden Age of Mexican cinema, in the 1940s and 1950s, 6 the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were a complete disaster. Each president appointed his own people to run the film industry as they saw fit, without any regard for continuity.
For example, while President Luis Echeverría (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) appointed his brother Raúl, who invested in the expansion of the National-Cinematographic-Bank (ncb), opened the National Cinematheque, and gave ample support and freedom to young directors, with some good results, López-Portillo, his successor, undid all the progress when he appointed his sister Margarita, who dissolved the ncb, neglected the Cinematheque to the point that it burned down in a fire, and "supervised" production so as not to allow "coarse themes that poison the mind" (Mora,-1997: 63) . In general, filmmakers complained about the prevalent cronyism that, sadly, seemed to confirm the warnings of neoliberal ideology about the politicians' conduct regarding the public well-being, not to mention producers' widely reported practice of embezzling from the funds earmarked for production (Mora,-1997: 50) .
Adding to this mismanagement of the industry, the advent of video and cable television in the 1980s resulted in the middle and upper classes largely abandoning cinemas, 7 except for the sporadic Hollywood blockbuster. There was no longer a narrative capable of unifying the public into a national audience like it did in the days of the Golden Age (Sánchez, 2014:-Intro.,-par. 9), perhaps a reflection of a society increasingly fragmented by social and economic divisions.
It was in this context that Salinas-de-Gortari's neoliberal privatization project was accepted without much resistance; Congress passed his 1992 Federal Film Law spearheading the change in 20 minutes (MacLaird,-2013: 27) . But the transition had already begun a few years earlier, in preparation for nafta's 1994 deadline. The film law's main impetus was privatization and deregulation. It did not go completely private, as neoliberal orthodoxy would want, because its Article 14 still recognized that film production is an activity of "national interest" -more on this later-; however, it greatly diminished the role of the state in production. Where previously it would completely finance films, now it would only "facilitate the initial development of projects and promote finished projects as national culture, but not have creative control or financial responsibility for the productions" (MacLaird-2013,-p.27 ). In other However, the most significant change in the industry had nothing to do with production or funding, but with exhibition. One of nafta's provisions mandated that the screen quota for Mexican films gradually come down to 10 percent, and in 1993, the government sold cotsa, the national theatre chain, to the private sector and deregulated ticket prices. The expectation was that the theatres would be renovated, but most of them were sold and changed use, and the chain was eventually dismantled in 1994 (Saavedra-Luna,-cited-in MacLaird,-2013: 28) . In their place, upscale multiplexes with state-of-the-art seating and projection equipment were built, most of them in affluent urban neighborhoods, often inside shopping malls. Prices doubled and are no longer affordable for the lower classes (MacLaird, 2013: 28) . In recent years, gentrification has intensified, with many multiplexes offering only vip theatres "with amenities such as all-leather individual recliners with side tables, a full bar, an extensive food menu (which can be ordered from waiters summoned by a button next to the seat), and a comfortable lobby that resembles a posh café" (Sánchez, 2014: conclusion, par. 1). Post-1992, cinema in Mexico has ceased to be identified as a cultural experience, to become, for the most part, an experience of consumption for those who can afford it.
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Audience and Content Shifts
Higher ticket prices, the gentrification of cinemas, and their concentration in urban areas caused a radical shift in film audiences, excluding most of the population. As of 2012, only 28 percent of Mexico's inhabitants went to the cinema at least once a year, and people who live away from large urban areas -42 percent of the population-were left without a cinema nearby (MacLaird, 2013: 46) . 8 This radical shift in audiences -from the lower to the middle and upper classes-was accompanied by a shift in the content of the films produced in Mexico, with post-1992 films unashamedly catering to the interests of the new, more affluent audience. As often happens in privatization processes, whatever censorship there was under state production is substituted by an -often more conservative-kind of market censorship. Three major trends in this direction have been identified: the proliferation of romantic comedies; a new sort of neo-Mexicanism that aims at re-writing Mexican history from an upper-class point of view; and films that feature sensationalistic and apolitical violence. Inevitably, this content shift has ideological consequences; it is worth a brief analysis.
Romantic Comedies
The romantic comedy is a genre that allows an evasion of national identity issues by centering its plots largely on issues of intimacy and romance (Sánchez,-2014 -(MacLaird, 2013: 48) The film that launched the genre in Mexico was Alfonso Cuarón's first feature Sólo con tu pareja (1991), centered on a publicist's sexual escapades. Despite an abundance of sexual activity and nudity, the deeper tone of the film is quite moralistic, as the main character is punished for his promiscuity and finally redeems himself by renouncing his former lifestyle and finding true love. The publicist would become a ubiquitous character in these films, "a trade clearly related to the new economic con- 
Neo-Mexicanist Films
If romantic comedies aimed at providing light entertainment and escape, neo-Mexicanist films tried to re-engage cinema's affluent audiences with Mexico's culture and traditions by basically re-writing Mexico's cultural history from their own point of view. Through superficially optimistic and teleological narratives that portray the past -including its hardships-as the inevitable road to a better future, these films make Mexican cultural history easy to digest, not only for Mexico's elites, but also for international audiences (MacLaird,-2013: 26) .
The most successful of these films was Alfonso Arau's Like Water for Chocolate (1992), a film that offers a romanticized gastronomic version of Mexico's history, from the revolution of 1910 up until Mexico's symbolic marriage to the U.S. with the signing of nafta (Sánchez, 2014:-ch. 1,-par. 14). The film portrays the story of a rich family of women living in a border town as they survive the revolution with all their privileges intact, including the undying loyalty of their servants. This survival is portrayed as well-earned: when the revolutionaries come to their door asking for a donation of provisions for the cause, the mother of the family scares them off with her rifle, telling them that they can take whatever is in the barn (barely anything, as it turns out), but the house provisions are "for her own private cause," and that if they try to enter her house she will shoot them, as she has a very bad temper. The only contemPorary iSSueS thing that the family loses to the revolution is a daughter, who falls in love with a revolutionary and runs off with him to become a revolutionary herself. She might be claimed as a progressive feminist character: however, she would be an odd one, as she comes back in the 1930s for the wedding of her niece (who is marrying a U.S.
American) in a Model T (a symbol of social status) and married to her revolutionary (Sánchez, 2014:-ch. 1,-sec. 1,-par. 9). Near the end of the film, we are surprised to learn that the story is being narrated from the present, by the grandaughter of one of the daughters, still privileged, and still cooking traditional Mexican dishes, just like her forebears used to.
"Revolutions wouldn't be so bad if you could eat at home with your family every day," says the revolutionary daughter when she comes back, thus managing to along with all the clientele of the restaurant where he is eating. As he seeks help from the authorities, he finds out that the policeman who is helping him is corrupt and works in tandem with the thieves. As he goes up the ladder of power, he discovers that the attorney general himself is part of the corruption scheme. In the end, though, with the help of his girlfriend Sofía, they unmask everyone and are set free to prosper -Gabriel, we are told during the credits, strikes it rich by making tv commercials. The first thing to note is that the film's depiction of crime in Mexico City is -certainly before 2006-a wild exaggeration, more the result of bourgeois paranoia than a reflection of reality.
But more importantly, in the world of Todo el poder, "Crime is not a result of social inequality, but of individual and institutional corruption" (Sánchez, 2014: ch. 3,-sec. 4, par. 11) , and no real structural changes are called for; all it takes for everyone to prosper is some good private citizens to care enough to stop government corruption.
Also in 2000, Amores perros, the most expensive and critically acclaimed Mexican film ever, was released. Despite a progressive exterior, it is nothing more than an expression of this same citizenship of fear, as Sánchez- (2006) successfully argues.
Particularly striking is the way in which El Chivo, one of the main characters, is punished for leaving his family to join a revolutionary group striving to "make the he also praised their quality, stating that they had been awarded 450 international prizes. He then proceeded to congratulate the audience -full of actors, directors, and film executives-as they were, he claimed, responsible for this success. The audience clapped, presumably in agreement.
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Later in the broadcast, the Ariel de Oro, the Academy's maximum honor, given in recognition of a notable career in film, was presented to Paul Leduc, a director who came to prominence during the 1970s with a series of anti-establishment films.
After thanking the Academy, he read a speech that served as a stark rebuttal of In the three preceding years, Leduc noted, overall box office grew, but in that same period, attendance to Mexican films fell to almost half, from 30 to 18 million tickets the -lack of-exhibition of Mexican films is simply the result of government interference; excessive production resulting from the government's partial funding of films that the free market has not fully approved. As soon as this interference stops, the market will reach equilibrium. Furthermore, the 72 percent of the Mexican people who have stopped going to theatres are not being excluded; they have just freely and rationally decided that they would rather invest their money in some other consumer good. This percentage should be interpreted as a necessary percentage for the industry to be optimized, something akin to the natural rate of unemployment, but for consumption. And finally, economic growth is always good; it means that people are finding more consumer satisfaction through cinema. Any other idea of what is good is an imposition of our ignorance on consumers' freedom; there is no such thing as the public interest, there is only individual interest, and it is being maximized by the free market. In case we needed someone to spell out this answer for us, Jack Valenti, head of the mpaa at the time of the signing of nafta did so. After Canada obtained a cultural exemption from nafta to protect its film industry 10 -an exemption that National cinematographic production constitutes an activity of public interest, without this undermining its commercial and industrial character, for it expresses Mexican culture and contributes to the strengthening of the bonds of national identity between the different groups that make it up. Thus, the state will foster its development in order for it to fulfill its function of strengthening the multicultural composition of the Mexican nation, through the funds specified by Law. (pef, Segob, 1992,-Article-14) Following this rationale, Mexican cinema has a serious deficit, and whatever growth it has managed under neoliberal policies has not been in the right direction.
The "multicultural composition of the Mexican nation" cannot be strengthened by the myriad of Hollywood films shown in our cinemas, or by the 5 percent of Mexican films that do get seen, when they are seen by -and filmed for-only 28 percent of the population.
And so, there appears to be a political conflict between the Mexican government's cultural objectives and the conditions stipulated by nafta. However, despite appearances, not much conflict exists at all. Article-14 is nothing more than a bit of demagoguery planted in the middle of an utterly neoliberal law. All the articles in the law that actually matter, that determine the material conditions of the industry, obey neoliberal dogma. Theatres were privatized, screen quotas for Mexican films reduced, and prices deregulated. The only provision of the law that infringes on the free market is funding for national productions, and it is actually a reduction over previous levels; but, more importantly, it is ultimately ineffectual when it is not matched by legislation to guarantee their proper exhibition. Furthermore, no one in the Mexican government is advocating a renegotiation of nafta or trying to obtain a cultural exemption.
Perhaps more important than the question of whether a conflict exists between
Mexico's government and nafta's conditions is whether an actual ideological conflict exists (beyond the sporadic rhetoric like Leduc's speech) between the Mexican people and its government's policies on cinema. That is to say, after so many years of brIef overvIeW of Güeros I now turn my attention away from neoliberalism and the Mexican film industry in general, and to the analysis of Güeros. Before a deeper analysis, it will be useful to briefly describe its production, reception, and plot, and about how the analysis of the film fits within the larger structure of this article.
Production
Like most recent Mexican films, Güeros is a co-production, financed in part by private enterprise, in this case, Catatonia Films, a small Mexican production company with five full-length films to its credit -none since Güeros-, and supported also by public funds, through Conaculta (the Mexican equivalent of a Ministry of Culture), and by Difusión-Cultural-unam, the cultural arm of the same university whose strike is portrayed in the film, and which opened its campus for the film to be shot on location. Even with all three entities chipping in, the film's budget was a modest Mex$2 240 000 11 (slightly 11 As reported in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico's official national gazette, found online at http:// www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo= 5383762&fecha=27/02/2015.
contemPorary iSSueS under US$200 000 at the time of production). It is the first feature film by Alonso
Ruizpalacios, who has a background in theatre, and who, in true auteur fashion, cowrote it with Gibrán-Portela.
Exhibition and Reception
The Blue-Ray and also available to stream on Netflix Mexico.
Plot
The plot of Güeros centers on its main character, nicknamed Sombra (Spanish for shadow), who is a student at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (unam) in Mexico City, which is in the middle of a student strike in reaction to the government's plans to begin charging tuition. He lives with fellow student Santos and is visited by his younger brother, Tomás, sent to him by their mother from the coastal state of Veracruz, because of bad behavior. Sombra is in love with Ana, an upper-class student who is very involved in the strike and has a radio program in the striking students' radio station.
Tomás finds Sombra and Santos in a kind of paralysis: they are supposed to be writing their dissertations, but they are not doing it; they never leave their apartment, so they have not paid their electricity bills and are forced to steal electricity from their neighbors; they support the strike, but do not attend the student demonstrations. This inactivity is wreaking havoc on Sombra, who is beginning to suffer from panic attacks. All of this changes when they are forced to flee their apartment because the neighbor catches them stealing his electricity. From this point on, the film becomes a road movie, with Sombra, Santos, Tomás, and eventually Ana embarking on a quest to find Epigmenio Cruz, an obscure rock and roll figure from the 1960s who Tomás listens to obsessively, as his father did before him. Epigmenio is dying alone from cirrhosis of the liver in a small hospital, but, they claim he could have changed Mexican rock and roll forever. Their quest to find him takes them on a tour of Mexico
City that passes through a lower class neighborhood, where they have a potentially dangerous encounter; a student assembly at the university, where Ana joins them; an upscale party populated by the very hip community of artists and intellectuals; the neighboring town of Texcoco, where they finally find and talk to Epigmenio Cruz; and finally, back to Mexico City, where they find themselves in the middle of a student protest.
Their encounter with Epigmenio is the climax of the film. After Epigmenio angrily refuses to autograph Tomás's audio cassette, Sombra explains who they are and why they have come looking for him, an introspective speech that reveals the healing effects that the road trip has had on him; he now appears ready to move again.
Later, in the car, he and Ana talk about the prejudices that have kept them from getting together and finally kiss. Back in Mexico City, they find themselves in the middle of a student demonstration. Ana immediately gets out of the car and joins it; after some hesitation, Sombra does too.
Why Güeros?
Güeros is not a typical neoliberal film; it does not fit neatly into any of the categories outlined above, so it will not serve as one more illustration of them. This is not to say that it has managed to escape neoliberalism. It is a neoliberal film in many ways: it clearly targets a sophisticated middle-and upper-class audience; it is crafted as an auteur film featuring black and white cinematography reminiscent in style of the French New Wave; it played in 15 international film festivals before opening in Mexico; it is set in Mexico City; its protagonists are middle-class and educated; it is a comedy with a light tone, and a romance is in the middle of its plot.
What is interesting about Güeros is that it is a neoliberal film that is aware of its own condition and struggling to transcend it. This struggle is manifested in two main ways. First, its plot attempts a criticism of neoliberal policy and its effects on Mexican society. Its focus on the state of mind of its protagonists -rather than on the actual political struggle-serves to illustrate the all-important ideological dimension of neoliberalism. Secondly, through a series of self-referential episodes, the film seeks to address the state of the Mexican film industry, its recent neoliberal malaise, and its own place within it. I will try to unpack these two manifestations in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
lookIng for epIgmenIo cruz: from the 1960s polItIcAl rebellIon to the 1990s polItIcAl pArAlysIs
The central topic of Güeros is political agency, and, more specifically, political agency in Mexico in the time of neoliberalism. The plot is set against the student strike, but the film's real focus is not on the political struggle, but on the students' state of mind.
That is to say, it is not about the fight against neoliberalism as policy -an outside entity-but against neoliberalism as ideology, the enemy within, existing in the mind of each member of a society that has been living under it for so long.
Collectively, the film portrays in-fighting and disagreements among the students.
These range from divergences about the goals of the strike -while some want to concentrate on very specific demands regarding the university, others want to turn it into a broader social movement-to divisions rooted in class and gender -when Ana gives a speech at the students assembly, she is subjected to shouts of "shut up you classist bitch!" and "striptease!" But the main focus is on Sombra and Santos, who seem to have internalized these collective divisions and find themselves paralyzed in many ways: politically, despite their support for the strike -Sombra shudders at Tomás's suggestion that they are scabs-they do not attend the student protests; in Sombra's words, they are "on strike from the strike." Sentimentally, Sombra is in love with Ana, but does nothing about it; academically, they are supposed to be writing their dissertations, but instead we watch as Sombra steadily presses the "delete" key on his dissertation file; and physically, they never leave their apartment, to the point that their electricity has been cut due to non-payment. They sit around, trying -and failing-to learn to do magic tricks and watching Big Brother on tv. Santos tries to scrape the fungi off the soles of his feet, and even has a Bartleby moment, when asked by Tomás why he doesn't just change universities, he replies, "I'd prefer not to." Sombra is doing even worse; all this stasis is having an effect on him, as he has frequent panic attacks, for which he is prescribed -in true neoliberal fashion-a vacation: "Go to the beach with your girlfriend." Escape, don't engage.
The whole country appears to be feeling the debilitating effects of neoliberalism. In Veracruz, Tomás's mother has to work as a seamstress -presumably sewing clothing that will end up being exported to the U.S.-, so she has no time to watch him; the last straw of his bad behavior is when he tosses water-filled balloons at a mother and baby from the roof of his house. In Texcoco, a different group of kids emulate this behavior by tossing bricks from a bridge; as in Tomás's case, their parents are nowhere to be found. All around, the family appears to have disintegrated -Ana cannot talk to her parents, and Sombra only talks to his mother when he needs money-, and no other social structure is there to pick up the pieces; the state is nowhere to be found and everyone is left to his or her own devices. The only presence of a state official is a cop who signals at Sombra and Santos to stop. But cops are not to be trusted, and as they try to get away from him, a wrong turn of the wheel takes them into a bad neighborhood where the unknown awaits -one of the consequences of marginalization and social fragmentation. Later, Tomás meets a lone migrant from Central America who expresses his gratitude at the opportunities that Mexico has afforded him: cross a border, become a different part of the chain of production; the essence of neoliberalism.
A clue to the roots of Sombra and Santos's paralysis is given to us via a recurring piece of idle conversation. It is on the topic of breakfast: after embarking on a brief catalogue of the different types of breakfast there are -English, Mexican, student breakfast-they come to "continental breakfast," which sparks some anger in Santos, who gripes, "What the fuck are they talking about? What continent? It's like saying that it's the breakfast of people over there. Who are they over there? And who are we here?" Continental breakfast is a product of capitalism and urbanization. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as people moved into cities and took jobs that required less physical stamina, the full, calorie-filled breakfast was replaced by a light continental breakfast. It is unclear if the film is making symbolic use of this somewhat obscure origin, but even if it is not, their annoyed reaction still remains at being subjected to a classification that comes from outside and makes little sense. Similar complaints appear again in the context of the strike, when their road trip accidentally takes them to the university and they are not allowed into the assembly until a friend vouches for them and lets them in; a discussion ensues about the exclusivity of the strike, and how certain groups seem to think they own it. Sombra and Santos's malaise seems to spring from a sense of social fragmentation and the ensuing impossibility of creating a truly collective movement, rendering any possible social activism ineffectual. This theme is emphasized by the film's title. Literally translated, the term "güero" means "blonde," but it is widely used to refer to people of higher social class, regardless of their hair and skin color. That is why Santos gets angry when a security guard at a party calls them "güeros," even though only Tomás has light hair, and Sombra is in fact very dark skinned.
This stagnant situation is finally alleviated by two events. First, Tomás's arrival from Veracruz. He represents a younger, more active Sombra. He still listens to Epigmenio contemPorary iSSueS
Cruz, like Sombra and their father used to, an indication that Sombra's paralysis is not a character trait, but the result of a process that has slowly eaten away at his true idealistic self. Tomás is constantly pressuring Sombra and Santos to leave the apartment, particularly when he finds out that Epigmenio is dying alone in a hospital and wants to go seek him out. They still will not budge, and it is not until the second mobilizing event -their neighbor coming after them after realizing they were stealing electricity from him-that they are finally forced to leave. It is then that the film changes from stasis to road trip; even the camera is visibly shaken from its tripod and put in motion.
The road trip is a quest to find Epigmenio. into the hands of neoliberalism, and, ironically, today's paralysis might be, in some small part, the result of yesterday's rebellion.
In the end, as often happens -and has perhaps become commonplace-, what matters is not the destination, but the road. By the time they find Epigmenio in a lonely Texcoco saloon, their experiences -and just the act of moving-seem to have had a healing effect on Sombra. Predictably, Epigmenio is a complete disappointment, but he provides an opportunity for Sombra to show us how much he has managed to understand. After Tomás (young Sombra) is dismissed by Epigmenio, Sombra takes charge, with a determination that we have not seen before, as he gives the climactic speech of the film. He introduces himself as Federico, using his real name instead of his shadowy nickname, and tells him that they have come because for the last six months he has not been able to sleep or to leave his apartment. They used to listen to his music with their father, but back then he did not understand his So, in the end, is Güeros just another neoliberal conservative film that prompts us into retreating from collective action and into personal growth? A fatalistic exhortation to stay at the train station and poetically and passively observe as the country and the world go down the drain? It certainly is not a revolutionary film pointing the way toward a specific social movement, but I would like to think that it is not conservative either, just very modest -perhaps justifiably so-in its progressive political ambitions. The way I see it, despite appearances to the contrary, Sombra's speech is political. It is aimed at those who do recognize the tragic consequences of neoliberalism, and it is an exhortation not to despair; or to despair, but not fall into paralysis because no solution seems to be in sight. So, if Güeros is not a revolutionary film, it at least defends the value of witnessing; if it is not a recipe for political revolution, at least it is an exhortation to not give up completely. Perhaps this answer had already been given to us, much earlier, when Sombra asks Tomás why they should go and look for Epigmenio, to which he replied, "Because no one else will." The end of the film seems to validate this reading. In the car ride back to Mexico City, Sombra and Ana start to kiss, a personal reward for Sombra's re-activation; but when they suddenly find themselves in the middle of a student protest, Ana gets out of the car and joins it without hesitation or even a pause for Sombra to join her. Sombra hesitates, but finally joins the march as well. The message is clear, romantic love was never the ultimate goal of Sombra's journey; regaining his political mobility was.
Güeros As A metA-cInemAtIc commentAry on the mexIcAn fIlm Industry As I mentioned above, Güeros engages neoliberalism in two ways. The first is by representing its paralyzing effects on political agency; and the second, to which I now turn, is through a series of self-referential episodes that aim at commenting on the current state of Mexican film industry and on Güeros's own place within it. In what follows, I will try to show that this self-referentiality is not gratuitous, but is closely linked to Güeros's political ambitions. A film that wants to address social fragmentation but is only going to be watched by one of those fragments has a basic problem.
Güeros is -as it had to be in order to exist-a film aimed at the social elites, and so, in a certain way, it is part of the problem. As such, it faced the need to talk about itself, about the audience watching it, and about the film industry that it is part of. This is achieved partly through a couple of self-referential episodes, and partly through a constant interplay with some of the genres that have become typical of neoliberal Mexican cinema.
This interplay begins in the very first scene. The first character to appear on camera is a hysterical woman, pleading with her baby to stop crying. As the phone keeps ringing, she is frantically putting clothes inside a suitcase and getting ready to leave. As she hits the street, we can see she has a black eye. But, as we -the audiencestart to get ready for what seems to be an intense domestic-violence melodrama, a water-filled balloon falls from the sky and hits the baby right on the head. The point of view of the camera then switches, and we watch from above as Tomás is dismayed by having hit the baby. We then follow Tomás as he tries to get away, and the mother and baby are never heard from again in the film, except for a brief moment, when Sombra asks him what happened to the baby, to which he dismissingly replies, "He's fine."
With this switch, the film tells us, right from the beginning, that there is something it doesn't want to be. By doing so, it manages two things: first, to insert itself as a film into the universe of topics that it wants to address, and second, it launches what will be a constant dialogue with film genres, through which it will manage to talk about the Mexican film industry and its recent vices. In this first episode of this dialogue, it is not important what exactly it is that it doesn't want to be -domestic violence melodramas are not the most typical of recent Mexican films-;
what matters is the typicality of the situation portrayed: the crying baby, the battered mother, the hysteria of the situation accentuated by the ringing phone. This typicality seems formulaic, just as Mexican cinema -and neoliberal cinema in general-has become.
A second episode of this interplay deals with the citizenship of fear, mentioned above. It begins when, during their road trip, they take a wrong turn and quickly end up in a bad neighborhood. When they come to a dead end and want to back up, a group of lower-class youngsters who had been playing football on the street block their way. Sombra immediately mutters, "Nooo," in a fatalistic tone of voice that conveys that this was to be expected -a typical situation. But what ensues in not really typical. One of the youngsters "offers" to help them find the main road if they
give him a lift, but before they have a chance to answer he unlocks the door and gets in the car. Throughout the ride, the camera focuses closely on Sombra's nervous face, with the youngster blurred in the background. In a sardonic tone of voice, the youngster asks Tomás: "What is it güerito [diminutive for güero], are you really afraid of me?" and laughs. He then tells them that his friends were going to kill them, adding, "What do you think about that?" But, despite the veiled violence in his tone, he only asks them to buy a round of beers. As he forces them to drink, he watches somewhat incredulously and giggles, as if surprised by his own power over them. As they finish the first round, and he goes to the store to get the second, Sombra, Santos, and Tomás frantically escape, leaving him behind. Afterwards, Tomás is upset and needs to vomit, so Sombra tries to calm him down by telling him that the youngster was only trying to make friends. When Tomás stares at him in disbelief, Sombra shrugs and says, "Well, maybe."
The truth is that we are not sure what to make of this whole episode. The lower class youngster obviously was not trying to make friends, but he was not that menacing either; he was quite skinny and had no kind of weapon. The real force at play here was middle-class fear of the lower classes. The film is careful not to interpret the violence encountered, cleverly creating a contrast with the recent sub-genre of films that exploit the politics of fear, thus pointing a finger, once again, at the social fragmentation that is behind these formulaic expressions of fear. A similar effect is achieved by Tomás's encounter with a migrant from Central America. Tomás -and we with him-listens to his story, but never offers a reply. Another reminder for the film's audience that Mexico is a very diverse place, and we do not get to experience or understand most of it.
Then there are two explicitly self-referential moments. First, when they go to the university for the student assembly, as they are talking to Oso, one of their fellow students, Santos -or maybe I should say, the actor playing Santos-suddenly asks him, "What do you think about the script of the movie?" We then see the clacker and film crew as he replies, "Frankly I don't like it, as I've told you many times before.
It's just a chase movie, and what I don't understand is how it is that you guys are the heroes." Later, at a very posh party full of very hip, pretentious, and affluent young contemPorary iSSueS people, apparently artists, we overhear conversations about film festivals and complaints about how Mexico is viewed abroad. Ana is welcomed by her fellow upperclass people, but Sombra, Santos, and Tomás are ignored and decide to step outside.
Once outside, Sombra rants about Mexican cinema: "Fucking Mexican cinema. They grab a bunch of beggars, shoot in black and white, and say they're making art films.
And the fucking directors, not satisfied with the humiliation of the Spanish Conquest, now go to the Old World and tell French critics that our country is full of pigs, derelicts, diabetics, sellouts, thieves, frauds, traitors, drunks, and whoremongers with inferiority complexes." Santos replies that Mexico is full of all that, and Sombra agrees, but complains that if they are going to humiliate us, they should do it with their own money and not with public funds. Tomás then asks, "Have you seen the film?", clearly referring to Güeros itself.
These two episodes serve the purpose of destroying the illusion created by the film's plot, and getting the audience to think about Güeros from outside its fictive world, as a film in itself and a product of the Mexican film industry. Sombra's rant serves as a complaint about an industry seemingly dominated by rich hipsters who use Mexico as a commodity to be packaged and sold to European audiences -in other words, about neo-Mexicanism. But the rant is not meant to put Güeros above the fray; on the contrary, the reference to shooting in black and white, as Güeros is, is there to make sure it is included as a film that uses public funds and premieres at international film festivals. 13 Moreover, Oso's stated displeasure with the script, and particularly with its choice of heroes, points to the unfairness of an industry that invariably sanctions the middle class as the privileged witnesses of our times, even when they are represented by a couple of lazy youngsters who steal electricity from their neighbors and a mischievous balloon thrower.
But more important than putting down the film industry -or the film itself as part of it-is what the mere presence of these references -hopefully-achieves: getting the audience to think of itself as part of the problem, maybe even as its root.
Sombra, Santos, Tomás, and Ana are very likeable characters with whom the audience is meant to identify, and despite the contrast established with the hipsters at the posh party, they are repeatedly -to their dismay-called "güeros." On one occasion, when a security guard (a member of the lower class) calls them "güeros," Santos gets agitated and complains to him about this designation, pointing at Sombra, who is very dark skinned, and asks him if he is a güero. Very matter-of-factly, the guard answers, "Yes, he is." And he is right; socially and culturally speaking, if we are inside a cinema or projected on the screen, we all are; and, as long as that is the case, norteamérica neoliberalism will succeed in its reduction of cinema to one more consumer good, utterly incapable of articulating any kind of cultural expression that could seriously challenge it.
conclusIons
More than just a set of policies, neoliberalism is an ideology that affects the subjectivity of those living under it. After almost 40 years of neoliberal hegemony, a growing minority has begun to realize that its market "equilibriums" are not really optimal for the majority of the people. Its conflation of citizen and consumer has fragmented society and done away with any kind of collective ethos, leaving people in a state of extreme precariousness and political isolation. And yet, reversing course away from neoliberalism is a difficult proposition, as neoliberal ideology has made any alternative hard to even imagine.
The case of the Mexican film industry is a prime example of this. From 1988 to 1994, it underwent a complete overhaul to comply with nafta's neoliberal dictums.
Formerly state owned and operated, it underwent a process of privatization and deregulation that saw its ticket prices double, its cinemas gentrify, and its audiences shift from the lower to the upper classes, with a content shift to match. The effective exclusion of 72 percent of the Mexican people from its cinemas is one more element contributing to the further stratification of society, by extending the marginalization of the lower classes from the economic realm to the cultural and political. And yet, despite some discordant voices, the material conditions of the industry prevent any real change, as production and exhibition of films hinges upon them being financially approved by the market.
Güeros is a good illustration of this situation. Anti-neoliberal in spirit, it had no choice but to conform to the neoliberal market and adopt its strategies. Forced to elaborate its critique from within a neoliberal shell, the result is an interesting paradox that uses self-reference to comment on the Mexican film industry and on itself, in an attempt to recognize its own limits as a neoliberal film and to point the finger at the deficiencies of the film industry. Definitely not a revolutionary film, Güeros is, at best, a sign of a growing consciousness about the ill effects of neoliberalism on Mexican society and its film industry, and at worst, an illustration of the very effective limits that neoliberalism and its free market imposes on any kind of expression of dissention.
